SUMMARY
The practice of clinical anaesthesia involves the intravenous injection of potent drugs, sometimes under conditions of haste or stress. Increasing workload may cause errors, particularly of the kind where part of a task is omitted. I Drug errors occur quite commonly, 2 and do occasionally have serious effects on patients. Although some errors will always occur, as they are a part of normal human behaviour, 3 an adverse outcome may be viewed with intolerance by administrators or the law. An ampoule error has resulted in the conviction of an anaesthetist for manslaughter. 4 In order to better devise strategies to prevent this problem, it was decided to study the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) 5 to obtain detailed information about the "wrong drug" problem in clinical anaesthetic practice,
METHODS
For this study, information on "wrong drugs" was extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for a patient. Details of the AIMS methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium, 6 All incident reports were studied in which the anaesthetist indicated that a "wrong ampoule" was involved, a "syringe swap" occurred, or the wrong drug was nearly or actually administered by other means, Excluded from consideration were over-and under-dosage errors, sideeffects, allergic reactions, drug interactions, and clinically inappropriate choice of a drug.
The two largest groups, ampoule and syringe errors, were divided into two subcategories, designated as type I and type 11. Type I incidents involve the anaesthetist making the primary error (e.g. when the anaesthetist selects the wrong ampoule or injects the wrong drug from a correctly labelled or coded syringe). Type II incidents are where a contributing factor has misled the anaesthetist (e.g. when the "wrong ampoule" had previously been placed in a container which was marked for the intended drug, when a syringe was taken which was wrongly labelled or coded, or when the anaesthetist was given a "wrong" ampoule or syringe). Coding is a substitute for labelling. It may be done by size, (e.g. relaxants only in the 5 ml syringe), by colour (e.g. blue tape for opioids), or position (e.g. sedatives at the front of the tray).
The "other" category of incidents included problems with vaporisers and infusion pumps, injections into the wrong line and label mix-ups with intravenous lines, giving sets and syringe drivers.
The effect of the "wrong drug" incident on the patient was noted (no effect, a minor or major "physiological disturbance", awareness, morbidity or death). For this analysis, a physiological disturbance was recorded not only if an untoward physiological change occurred, but also if the administration of the wrong drug meant that a clinically significant intended effect did not occur (e.g. when relaxation did not occur after giving fentanyl instead of suxamethonium).
A similar criterion was applied in examining the detection of the error. Outcome detection was recorded if the incident was detected by an unexpected physiological change, e.g. fasciculations or hypertension. It was also recorded if there was no change when one was expected (e.g. no change in conscious state when cefoxitin was given instead of thiopentone).
Statistical analysis of frequency differences was by Fisher's Exact test or Chi-squared with Yate's correction. Because of the repeated testing, significance was set at the 0.01 level.
RESULTS

Incidence
There were 144 "wrong drug" problems in the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. Figures I shows the distribution of the 144 problems amongst the major categories and the frequency of actual administration of the wrong drug to the patient. Figure 2 shows the distribution of type I and type 11 errors for ampoules and syringes and the incidence of administration. The wrong drug was actually given significantly more frequently with syringe than with ampoule errors.
Types of Drugs Involved
Overall, the drugs most commonly involved were nondepolarising relaxants (44 incidents), opioids excluding naloxone (27 incidents), suxamethonium (26 incidents) and local anaesthetics (15 incidents). Table  I lists, in order of frequency, the drugs which were intended to be given. were actually selected and subdivides them into whether or not they were given. 
Ampoule Errors
The commonest drugs involved in "wrong ampoule" incidents were nondepolarising relaxants (17 incidents), local anaesthetics (10 incidents), suxamethonium (13 incidents) and opioids (7 incidents). There were 10 incidents of confusion between pancuronium and suxamethonium. In seven incidents, suxamethonium was intended but pancuronium selected and on all but one occasion, given. In three incidents, pancuronium was intended but suxamethonium selected and on two occasions, given.
Syringe Swaps
The commonest drugs implicated in the syringe swap incidents were non-depolarising relaxants (29 incidents), followed by opioids (19 incidents), suxamethonium (12 incidents) and midazolam (10 inci-dents). The drugs most commonly involved in a swap were fentanyl and suxamethonium. In eight incidents, fentanyl was intended and suxamethonium selected and in two incidents suxamethonium was intended but fentanyl selected. In 81070 of these cases, the wrong drug was actually given.
Other Errors
There were 14 vaporiser incidents. In eleven incidents, a vaporiser was unintentionally' 'on" at the beginning of the case (see "Nil" category in Table 1 ). In seven reports this resulted in halothane being given. There were five reports of confusion between an intravenous line and another line such as an epidural catheter. The remaining incidents were a wide variety; tablet or injection errors on the wards with premedication orders, errors in identifying intravenous lines, errors in calculating and preparing drug doses, and errors in syringe and pump settings.
Outcome
In 64070 of the incidents in which the wrong drug was given, some physiological change occurred, but none was fatal. Nevertheless, it was judged that there was potential for serious harm in 74070 of these, e.g. relaxant paralysis when not intended, or severe hypertension from metaraminol given instead of atropine.
In 50070 of the 115 incidents in which the drug was given, the error was detected by an unexpected outcome. In 40070 this was an unexpected effect (e.g. a change in blood pressure on 15 occasions and the onset of paralysis on 10 occasions). In 10070 the error was detected by the failure of an expected change to occur (e.g. no fasciculations after "suxamethonium", or no rise in heart rate after "atropine").
Factors contributing to the incident.
Factors contributing with respect to syringe size and labelling, ampoule appearance and location, and confusion between two people are summarized in Table  3 . Similarity of labelling or shape was a frequent contributing factor (45070). Incidents implicating similarity of appearance are almost completely confined to "wrong drug" incidents and are not evident in the other classes of incidents. When compared to the contributing factors identified in the other 1856 incidents inattention (49 vs 9070), haste (45 vs 10070), communication failure (31 vs 9070) and fatigue (10 vs 2070) were significantly more frequently cited in the 144 "wrong drug" incidents. Communication failure was cited in 63070 of type II syringe errors. Factors minimizing the incident.
"Rechecking" was cited significantly more often (33070) in wrong drug incidents than in the other 1856 incidents (15070). Prior experience was considered to have been helpful in fewer incidents (17070) than generally (36070), and monitoring was not usually helpful in detecting wrong drug incidents (17070 of 144 incidents vs 40070 for the 1846 incidents), but was valuable on occasions. For example, the detection of a tachycardia with a pulse oximeter or ECG. Also, in three cases injection of a nondepolarising relaxant drug was detected by the unexpected loss of muscle twitch with a nerve stimulator.
Corrective or preventive strategies.
Additional checking discipline (44070 vs 18070), fatigue alleviation routines (6.3070 vs 1.2070), and the development of specific protocols (25070 vs 9.3070), were cited significantly more frequently in the 144 "wrong drug" incidents than in the remaining 1856; in 19070 no suggestions were made. Nine percent of reports also included a suggestion that the labelling of drugs should be improved.
DISCUSSION
Incidence and severity. The "wrong drug" group of AIMS incidents considered in this report constitute 7.2070 of the first 2000 incidents reported. It is interesting that 6070 of the "critical incidents" in Cooper's original study were "wrong drug" errors. 7 In the AIMS group the potential for significant patient harm, three in every four incidents, was appreciable. The wrong drug problem is therefore not only relatively common, but potentially dangerous. All such events must be regarded as preventable, difficult though this may be in practice.
Drugs involved.
Perhaps not surprisingly, nondepolarising relaxants, opioids, suxamethonium and reversal drugs feature prominently in this series.
Also of note are the incidents with saline and water ampoules. Injecting potassium, lignocaine, metaraminol or pancuronium instead of saline or water can obviously have serious consequences. It is notable that the USA drug labelling code does not have any specific identification code for saline or water. 8 A positive colour identification may be appropriate.
Syringe and ampoule errors. "Syringe swap" errors were more common than ampoule errors, particularly for drugs which were given. Thus syringes, rather than ampoules, constitute the major hazard in anaesthesia, despite past emphasis on ampoules. The selection of the wrong drug is associated with an 81070 chance that the drug will actually be given to the patient. I f the wrongly selected drug is in an ampoule, the risk of administration is 58%, but if in a syringe, is 93%. Rechecking of the ampoule was the most successful preventive strategy.
Other errors. Although a wide range of "wrong drug" errors were reported, two patterns stand out. Vaporizers accidently left "on" were common, particularly at the beginning of a case. These classical "rule-based" errors should be reduced by awareness of the problem and by initial checking. 9 The other notable pattern was that of injection into another I V line or a line such as epidural catheter not intended for IV injection. Perhaps labelling close to the injection site would help. There also appears to be a common di fficulty in calculating dilution and dose rates.
Outcome. In 50% of the incidents where the wrong drug was given, the mistake was detected by an unexpected outcome. It is possible that many more "wrong drug" errors occur, but remain undetected because the intended drug would have had, and the given drug had, little or no immediately obvious effect.
Contributing factors. The most common incident overall (40%) was a syringe swap; the same sized syringes were involved in 52070 of these cases. Syringe labelling provides no guarantee of safety, as 63% of the wrong drug incidents with syringes occurred with correctly labelled syringes. These include the phenomenon of "brain failure" where the anaesthetist, perhaps because of distraction or sleep-deprivation, 10 knows what drug he or she wants to give, but in reading a correctly labelled syringe containing another drug takes this syringe and administers the (wrong) drug! This does not mean that syringe labelling is of no value, but rather that it must be regarded as only one of a range of strategies, and that no single strategy can be expected to solve the entire problem.
The relative infrequency of wrong drug events involving thiopentone (8 incidents) incidents) may be noteworthy, particularly as these two drugs have extremely high use and therefore riskexposure. This may indicate that colour is a powerful cue. Indeed, in one report, where cefoxitin was substituted for thiopentone at induction, the similar yellow solution may have been a factor contributing to the error.
In 16% of the incidents in this study, it was reported that the involvement of more than one person contributed to the drug mix-up. Such confusion would appear to be more likely with syringes than with ampoules.
Ampoule design seems to contribute to the problem; 11 54% of ampoule errors were associated with ampoules which were similar. Although anaesthetists have objected to look-alike ampoules, given the wide range of drugs available and the limited range of sizes and colours for ampoules, it is inevitable that similarities will exist. Thus, as similar ampoules seem unavoidable, efforts directed towards protocol and checking safeguards may prove to be the most fruitful. At this stage, there is no evidence that the current trend to plastic "no-needle" ampoules such as the Polyamp (Astra) has lessened the risk. Indeed the two most commonly implicated wrong ampoules in this study, pancuronium and suxamethonium, remain very similar in appearance in their new presentation, and several AIMS incident reports commented on this. The factors of fatigue, haste and inattention have previously been identified as potential causes of errors, " and this is consistent with these AIMS data. Yet, in spite of the higher frequency of comment about fatigue, haste, inattention and communication difficulty, none of these factors appeared to influence whether the wrong drug was actually given. The predominant opinion of those reporting was that for the "wrong drugs" problem, corrective strategies should be focussed on the behavioural aspects of the problem. The pattern of incidents with respect to the two major categories, ampoules and syringes. The major categories are subdivided into type I, where there was a primary error by the anaesthetist, and type II where there were misleading circumstances. The shaded area shows the proportion in each category in which the drug was actually given to the patient.
PREVENTATIVE STRATEGIES Superficially, it would appear that the problem is due to a failure to check, a "rule based" error, with similarity being a major contributing factor. 9."" This is the case with, for example, a vaporizer being inadvertently "on" at the start of a case. However no anaesthetist deliberately selects an ampoule randomly from a drawer. Careful consideration suggests that the problem is in fact a "slip".' Fatigue, haste and inattention all degrade the ability of the anaesthetist to monitor the sequence of a series of actions which he or she is very skilled at doing, and which are normally done on "automatic pilot". Here, similarity is indeed a problem as a close but not perfect cue is accepted, which is a well known failure of normal cognitive function. 12 ." The AIMS data have shown that the most prominent problem is injecting the wrong drug from a correctly coded or correctly labelled syringe. Working from first principles, forcing the anaesthetist to engage in a higher cognitive check of the "automatic" actions is a strategy which may work but would entail imposing additional discipline on the clinician. The "wrong drug" problem has many complex interacting contributing factors, and the following strategies are suggested. One fifth of ampoule errors occurred because the cue used for selection was the location of the ampOUle. Unpacking ampoules and inserting into easy-to-access containers diminishes the identifying cues. Manufacturers should be encouraged to adopt compact "blister" packaging designed to render products more easily identifiable, whilst still permitting accommodation in a compact space. Nevertheless, current practice in many hospitals involves unpacking of drugs. Some may consider this undesirable. However, where this system is used an alternative strategy could then be to standardise the storage layout in drug trolleys using a physical template and colour coding of classes of drugs. This could also be used to ensure rotation of drug stocks. 4. When a drug is selected for "drawing up" into a syringe, it is vital that the ampoule label be read and re-read. Once the drug is in the syringe, the risk of detecting the error appears to be decreased and the risk of giving the drug enhanced. 5. Drawing up and labelling. Only one drug should be drawn up at a time. "Coding" of contents of a syringe by syringe size or layout on the working surface may be an effective strategy for "solo" anaesthetists who are never relieved, but constitutes a completely unsatisfactory strategy when a "team" approach is used. Thus it should be policy that as each drug is drawn up, the syringe is labelled with the name of the drug, and re-checked with the empty ampoule before setting it aside or discarding it. A standard convention should be used e.g. the generic name should always be used with the concentration of the drug in the syringe in mg/m!. Labelling is particularly important when more than one anaesthetist is involved. 6. The syringe similarity problem. Over half of all syringe swaps involved syringes of the same size and nearly two thirds involved syringes that were correctly labelled. One manufacturer is planning to offer syringes with red coloured plungers approximating to the ASTM relaxant colour. It is possible that plungers in other colours to match ampoule colour could be produced. This greatly enhanced cue could therefore act at the syringe stage as wel!.
Suggested Strategies
It would be important however to try and to ensure that only one concentration of each type of drug was available, and that a standard dilution was used on each occasion. 7. Checking Discipline. All anaesthetists should be aware that errors are common, and that they occur both with ampoules and syringes. It may help if they are also aware that slips are usually caused by failure to monitor a highly routine action, and that this failure is much more likely when limited cognitive resources are compromised by haste, inattention, distraction, or fatigue. 8. Communication problems. Anaesthetists should be aware that this is an additional cause of the wrong drug being given when two people are involved in selecting and giving a drug. With more than one person involved, a person drawing up or giving a drug should always double check with their colleague.
